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SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR
ISSUE, SUPPORTIVE OF SIX-PARTY TALKS

Summary

11. (SBU) The IAEA September Board of Governors registered grave concern over the DPRK's escalatory actions, particularly the September 4 letter to the President of the UN Security Council announcing the DPRK was in the "final stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking weaponization of newly extracted plutonium from the reprocessing of spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. The Director General's introductory remarks on North Korea were brief; he reminded Board members that the IAEA had been unable to carry out any monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK since it had ceased all cooperation with the IAEA in April. Twelve statements were delivered under the Agenda item on the Application of Safeguards in the DPRK: Six-Party partners, the EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Switzerland, Cuba, Philippines, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea under Rule 50. All interventions urged North Korea to resume a dialogue with the international community and return to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards.
End Summary.

DG Remarks

12. (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by the Board of Governors, since inspectors were expelled from Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14). Inspectors returned to North Korea in July 2007 at the request of the Six Parties under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement. The IAEA was once again asked to leave North Korea on April 16, 2009 when the DPRK ceased all cooperation with the IAEA.

13. (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the Director General reminded the Board that the IAEA had been unable to carry out any monitoring or verification activities in the DPRK since April. The Director General called on all parties to work for a comprehensive solution through diplomatic means that would bring the DPRK back to the NPT and address its security concerns, humanitarian needs, and other political and economic requirements.

Six Parties Express Concern,
Call for Diplomatic Resolution

14. (SBU) Six-Party members represented on the Board (China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S.) and South Korea (under Rule 50) called on DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China spoke first and made a brief statement expressing its concern with the situation in North Korea and its firm commitment to achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. China noted the issue can only be resolved peacefully through diplomatic efforts and called on the Six Parties to maintain and use its effective platform. Japan expressed serious concern over the DPRK's September 4 letter to the President of the UN Security Council and stated the DPRK's activities constitute a grave threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community. Japan noted it is "totally unacceptable" that the DPRK launched a ballistic missile on July 4 in "flagrant disregard" of UNSCR 1874 and described as equally unacceptable the DPRK's announcement of its intent to weaponize the whole amount of newly extracted plutonium and commence uranium enrichment. South Korea expressed grave concern about the DPRK's decision to cease cooperation with the IAEA and called on the international community to fully implement UNSCR 1874.

15. (SBU) Russia made a strong statement that described the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests as a "serious blow" to international efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and a threat to security and stability in the region. Russia stated it supports resumption of IAEA activities in North Korea and pointed out that the IAEA is the only organization with the proper expertise to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities and therefore must play a central role in the future. Russia noted its support for a

diplomatic resolution to the DPRK nuclear issue and called on North Korea to return to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and return to the Six-Party Talks.

Support for UNSCR 1874
and the Six Party Talks

16. (SBU) There was broad support among Board members for the Six-Party Talks and resuming a dialogue towards a peaceful resolution. Canada, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa, and the Philippines all called for the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks, and several of these Board members emphasized that North Korea must return to the negotiating table without preconditions. Canada called on the DPRK to fulfill all of its commitments made as part of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 2005 as well as the October 2007 agreement on Second Phase Actions. Egypt noted its support of the diplomatic efforts to address the DPRK nuclear issue and called for similar diplomatic efforts to be undertaken to address nuclear concerns in other parts of the world.

17. (SBU) Board members reiterated their support for UNSCR 1874 and called on the DPRK to comply with its obligations under the resolution to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Australia noted that UNSCR 1874 sends a "clear and united signal from the international community that the DPRK must end its nuclear weapons program." Australia, along with the EU, Japan, and South Korea additionally called upon the international community to fully implement UNSCR 1874.

18. (SBU) Other Board members echoed the Six parties' expressions of concern with North Korea's September 4 letter to the President of the UN Security Council announcing it is in the "final stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking weaponization of newly extracted plutonium from the reprocessing spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. Canada noted the DPRK's actions pose a "grave threat" to regional and international security and a "serious challenge" to the nonproliferation regime. The Philippines remarked that North Korea's provocations "negate forward momentum" and are a

setback for the nonproliferation regime.

¶9. (SBU) Cuba took the opportunity to raise disarmament, noting that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons will guarantee the peace and stability for the entire world. Cuba lamented the slow progress on disarmament and appealed to nuclear weapons states to immediately comply with Article VI of the NPT.

¶10. (SBU) Comment: Beyond broad expressions of concern, there really is not much for the IAEA Board or Director General to say at this point on the DPRK's indigenous program. So long as the DPRK continues to reject IAEA access pursuant to Six-Party initiatives, the IAEA focus on DPRK will shift to continuing to confirm the nature of the DPRK-supplied facility in Syria, and the IAEA will also eventually need to consider whether safeguards at the DPRK's IRT research reactor should be reinstated under "INFCIRC/66"-type safeguards if it is finally determined that the DPRK is no longer an NPT party and therefore no longer subject to NPT-type safeguards.

U.S. Statement on DPRK

¶11. (SBU) Madam Chairwoman,

The international nonproliferation regime faces a critical challenge from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. North Korea's April 5 and July 4 ballistic missile tests and the May 25 nuclear test, in clear violation of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, have seriously threatened international peace and security. North Korea's actions, as well as its recent provocative statements, imperil the nonproliferation objectives shared by the community of responsible nations. This includes its

decision to cease cooperation with the IAEA, expel Agency monitors and U.S. observers, and its announced intentions to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and reprocess the spent fuel - all in contravention of its Six-Party commitments.

The international community has condemned these actions with a unified voice through the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. This resolution, like Resolution 1718, demands that North Korea not conduct any additional nuclear tests or launches using ballistic missile technology.

It also requires North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. Furthermore, the resolution demands that the DPRK return, at an early date, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and calls on North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions.

The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1874 represents a global consensus on the imperative to eliminate the DPRK's ability to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related activities and to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea. The new measures under this resolution include a total ban on arms exports from North Korea and a major expansion of the ban on arms imports, new financial measures, and enhanced inspection provisions for suspected transfers of proscribed cargo. Pursuant to UNSCR 1874, the DPRK Sanctions Committee has also designated a number of individuals, entities, and goods related to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It is our belief that effective implementation of this resolution is imperative to convince North Korea that its only viable option is a return to diplomacy and denuclearization.

The United States has been coordinating closely with key international partners to implement resolution 1874. At the direction of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, we are working hard to promote full implementation of these

resolutions and continued vigilance against North Korea's proliferation and other illicit activities. The United States urges all states to implement fully Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and commends the efforts of those that have acted proactively and effectively to enforce the relevant provisions. We call on all states to be vigilant and transparent in their dealings with North Korea. These resolutions, combined with the designations authorized by the United Nations Sanctions Committee, and the establishment of a Panel of Experts to monitor implementation, provide a powerful mechanism to curb North Korea's unacceptable activities and compel it to commit to denuclearization and nonproliferation.

The United States calls on North Korea to return without conditions to the Six Party Talks and honor its commitments to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Our policy remains the same. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, and we remain committed to the goals of the September 2005 Joint Statement. North Korea must signal that it is willing to commit to an irreversible process of complete and verifiable denuclearization. We are open to engaging North Korea, including bilaterally within the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks. We continue to believe that the IAEA has an important role to play in this process, the ultimate objective of which is to return a North Korea free of nuclear weapons and related programs to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards - a process through which North Korea can end its isolation and take its place as a responsible member of the community of nations. As my President has said, "North Korea has a pathway to acceptance in the international community, but it will not find that acceptance unless it abandons its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and abides by its international obligations and commitments."

Our firm response to North Korea's actions and our collective resolve to bring North Korea into compliance with its obligations and commitments are vital not only to global peace and security but to the credibility and viability of the international nonproliferation regime itself.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

DAVIES